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ABSTRACT 
An air monitoring system, Program BioWatch, was introduced in the civilian 
United States (U.S.) in 2003 to detect an intentional release of a biological agent in a 
major metropolitan area.  As an ambient air program, BioWatch was assigned to the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to administer at the local level though the state 
equivalent of the U.S. EPA.  Since the BioWatch Program is testing for biological agents 
that can cause illness and death in the human population, there is an obvious roll for 
public health involvement in the program.  However, over time, the EPA leadership has 
struggled with the administration of the program, as well as the state EPA programs and 
efforts with the local public health agencies.   
This thesis explores the current assigned leadership of the BioWatch Program 
primarily at the state and local levels.  By using the experiences of the Missouri 
BioWatch Program in St. Louis, a shared leadership is suggested between the state health 
department and the state EPA to maximize efforts and related to the BioWatch Program 
by use of a memorandum of agreement. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROBLEM  
Since the terrorist attacks on the U.S. in September 2001 and the anthrax letters 
that closely followed, there is considerable focus on the threat of biological terrorism in 
the civilian United States.  Biological terrorism is not a new concept; however, military 
leaders throughout history considered infectious disease pathogens as weapons in military 
campaigns.  Western powers, including the U.S., Great Britain, Canada, and the former 
Soviet Union had biological weapons research programs for both offensive and defensive 
purposes.  To have a successful biological weapons program, the delivery method must 
be efficient and affect as many of the targeted population as possible.  Therefore, in a 
military setting, biological warfare agents are most likely to be delivered by aerosol 
dispersion in order to optimize the impact on the targeted population.  In response, to 
protect its own population or military troops, the U.S. developed air-monitoring 
technologies to detect such attacks.  An air monitoring system, Program BioWatch, was 
introduced in the civilian U.S. in 2003 to detect an intentional release of a biological 
agent in a major metropolitan area.  The program was introduced to the state and local 
partners through the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) very quickly and with 
little guidance on how to coordinate the program and expectations.    
In February 2004, the report entitled “EPA’s Homeland Security Role to Protect 
Air for Terrorist Threats needs to be Better Defined,” states the EPA plays a supporting 
role in the BioWatch Program by facilitating the program’s air sampling.  It is noted in 
the report that EPA officials lack clearly defined roles and responsibilities needed to 
effectively perform their duties in meeting the challenges EPA faces in protecting the 
nation against the threat of terrorism.1  The report also states, “Our report does not claim 
that EPA’s Office of Homeland Security does not know its responsibilities; rather, we 
believe this office is not fulfilling its responsibilities as delegated by the EPA 
                                                 
1 Office of the Inspector General Evaluation Report, EPA’s Homeland Security Role to Protect Air 
from Terrorist Threats Needs to be Better Defined, Report no. 2004–M–000005, February 20, 2004. 
 2
administrator.”2  The Office of Inspector General followed up this report with another 
one in March 2005, “EPA Needs to Fulfill Its Designated Responsibilities to Ensure 
Effective BioWatch Program.”  This report claims that the EPA did not ensure that the 
BioWatch Network was deployed and maintained adequately as well as that the agency 
was not prepared to assist with consequence management plans.3  
The U.S. EPA is not the only federal program that is not receiving high marks for 
its management of the BioWatch Program.  The 2005 Ready or Not? Protecting the 
Public’s Health From Disease, Disasters, and Bioterrism, published by Robert Wood 
Johnson Foundation’s, Trust for America’s Health, noted a grade of “D” for 
“Coordination among federal agencies, the establishment of measurable goals and 
directions, BioWatch, and the federal health response to Hurricane Katrina” in its key 
findings.4  The 2008 Ready or Not? report continued to point out problems related to the 
BioWatch Program directly related to the laboratory component and include the 
following. 
 The lack of contractual relationship between DHS and public health 
laboratories 
 Uncompensated laboratory costs 
 Unclear rules for the management and oversight of BioWatch contract 
employees by state public health lab employees 
 Gaps in performance data necessary for state and local labs to assess 
BioWatch responses 
 Security clearance concerns5 
The St. Louis, Missouri BioWatch Program, as many as other BioWatch 
Programs, is still working through complicated issues and “growing pains” related to 
strategies and policies at the state and local levels.  The strategies and policies are 
                                                 
2 Office of the Inspector General Evaluation Report, EPA’s Homeland Security Role to Protect Air 
from Terrorist Threats Needs to be Better Defined, 9.  
3 Office of the Inspector General Evaluation Report, EPA Needs to Fulfill Its Designated 
Responsibilities to Ensure an Effective BioWatch Program, Report no. 2005–P–00012, March 23, 2005. 
4 Trust for America’s Health Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, Ready or Not? Protecting the 
Public’s Health from Diseases, Disasters, and Bioterrorism, December 12, 2005, 2. 
5 Ibid., 62. 
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continuously being updated and implemented in order to make the program more 
effective.  This paper explores a solution that will enhance the BioWatch Program’s 
effectiveness at the state and local levels by ensuring a solid relationship between state 
agencies and the local agencies that are responsible for the program.  This solution may 
also be applied to other BioWatch Programs, especially those programs that are multi-
departmental at the state and local levels, which make decisions and planning more 
challenging than those programs that are in a single governmental department. 
Currently, the BioWatch Program is administered by the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) on the federal level.  DHS administers the program through 
the state equivalent to the U.S. EPA and directly to the state EPAs.  The state agencies in 
turn work with and enter into a contractual relationships with the local public health 
agency(ies), which collects filters on a daily basis.  The procedures do not include the 
state health department, which is the traditional partner with the local public health 
agencies and is the provider of support for local public health programs, including 
preparedness for emergencies such as bioterrorism.  In addition, the procedures and 
system do not provide administrative accountability for the local public health agencies 
and their role in the BioWatch Program.  Local public health officials do not have formal 
or consistent guidance from the federal or state BioWatch Program regarding reporting 
BioWatch filter positives to state public health officials.  Figure 1 is a chart that 
demonstrates the flow and relationships of the key players of the BioWatch Program.  A 
state agency that primarily regulates pollutants and harmful agents, such as industrial 
emissions, asbestos, and mercury has been placed in a position where it is required to 
provide administrative support and leadership for a profession and organizations with 
which it has no traditional relationship or influence.  Although the state and federal EPA 
departments play a key role in BioWatch, the lack of understanding between the 
professions causes miscommunication and deters better management and promotion of 
the BioWatch Program. 
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Figure 1.   BioWatch Program Administration Cycle:  The DHS BioWatch Program 
directly funds the state EPA and works with the U.S. EPA to coordinate at 
the state level.  The state EPA provides dollars to the local public health 
agencies leaving out the state health department as an appropriate 
administrator and a standard public health partner. 
The lines of responsibility and communication are fuzzy at best and in some cases 
are difficult to determine where they are and who has responsibility for significant 
management of the program outside the laboratory and filter replacement and transport 
aspects of the program.  It is unclear what is supposed to happen with the information and 
who is supposed to lead the response in the case a situation is detected.  Currently, the 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security administers the BioWatch Program with 
assistance from CDC and the U.S. EPA.  Dollars flow directly to the states’ 
environmental agencies to the local public health agencies.  There are no traditional or 




confusing manner that the BioWatch Program has taken will continue to cause low 
“grades” for all involved, which translates to uncertainty to the general public when a 
positive is detected and instruction is provided. 
The BioWatch Network relies on partnerships.  This collaboration includes every 
facet of BioWatch, from placing of air monitors by the federal EPA, collection of filters 
by the local public health agencies, testing and identification of an agent by the local or 
state laboratory, to consequence management by all the state, local and federal public 
health, EPA, law enforcement, and emergency management agencies.  The competence 
of an effective system relies heavily on the organizations at the state and local levels that 
understand the biological agents and will provide epidemiological investigation support, 
coordinate mass distribution and dispensing of medications, and that can successfully 
prepare for, mitigate, respond to and recover from a massive outbreak—specifically 
public health.  
From the beginning of the BioWatch Program, there were signs of limited 
involvement from the public health sector and the BioWatch Program management at the 
federal level did not encourage or mandate public health’s seat at the table.  Because of 
the limited involvement of public health at the beginning, it affected the EPAs ability to 
make local public health agencies accountable for administration oversight, strategic 
planning, consequence management and reporting efforts.  This is primarily because they 
did not traditionally work with public health entities and did not have the authority to 
require planning efforts outside of the laboratory and collection cycle. 
Another aspect that caused the inability to hold local agencies accountable is tied 
to many aspects of how the BioWatch Program was presented initially and how the 
program is financially administered and continues to be today from DHS through the 
state EPA departments.  In January 2003, the state level EPA departments of the states 
that “may” have a BioWatch city participated in a conference call hosted by the 
Environmental Council of the States, Appendix A is a letter from the Missouri 
Department of Natural Resources to the states Homeland Security Advisor dated January 
30, 2003 discussing the call.  The call outlined how the program would “unfold” within 
60 days of the call, which included placing monitor in 20 major cities in the nation; 
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collection of the filters would be done daily and transported to a laboratory within the 
National Response Laboratory Network; funding for the BioWatch program would be 
distributed to the states through a granting process that would cover equipment 
purchases, installation of monitoring equipment, and maintenance; and laboratory 
funding would come from a separate source.  The state EPA departments were also 
instructed to coordinate with state homeland security advisors and health departments 
after the call; however, those entities were not invited to the initial planning calls or 
meeting regarding the program and were never given a chance to contribute to the 
planning and rolling out of the program.6 
It can be inferred from this letter that key partners were not invited to the initial 
call to discuss the BioWatch Program, and, therefore, key partners were excluded from 
critical information from the beginning.  The letter also outlines the grant source for the 
BioWatch program and indicates that it will be used for equipment and maintenance.  
There is no mention of funding for consequence management and administration of the 
public health aspect of the program leaving out critical components.  Components that 
need consideration from the BioWatch Program administration include complicated 
planning pieces that include a wide variety of partners, e.g., law enforcement and courier 
services, training, annual exercises, and monitoring of the day-to-day aspects of the 
program.  At no point is it noted that the Environmental Council of the States or the U.S. 
EPA discuss funding for above administration or training related to the program.  The 
funding stream continues today for supplies and replacement equipment only.7 
If the BioWatch Program is to be most effective the strategies and polices related 
to administration and its implementation must be clearly defined and the public health 
responsibilities shifted to the state public health department so that effective 
administration and consequence management can be achieved.  The focus of this research 
is to explore how to accomplish the leadership change.   
                                                 
6 Letter from Stephen Mahfood, Director of Missouri Department of Natural Resources to Colonel 
Tim Daniels, Director of Missouri Office of Homeland Security, January 30, 2003. Letter in private papers 
of Nancy Bush. 
7 State of Missouri, Missouri State Auditor’s Office, Single Audit Year Ended June 30, 2007, Report 
no. 208–17, March 2008, 25. 
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B. BACKGROUND 
The BioWatch Program is new in the civilian arena, and, therefore, the strategies, 
policies, and technology surrounding the program are still in development and being 
tested by real events and positives detected from filters collected daily from the field.  
Since 2003, there have been new guidelines for laboratories and the BioWatch Program 
has been tested repeatedly, and there has never been a false positive within the system 
reported through July 2008.8  Goals have been defined for the program by the federal 
government and include the following: 
 Provide early warning of a biological attack by quickly identifying the 
bio-agent, which will minimize casualties in an effected area; 
 Assist in establishing forensic evidence on the source, nature, and extent 
of biological attack to assist law enforcement officials in identifying the 
perpetrators; and 
 Determine a preliminary spatial distribution of biological contamination, 
including what populations may have been exposed.9 
In order for the BioWatch Program to function properly on the federal level 
operations and agreements were made among the major players of the program.  The 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC), a Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) agency were to 
coordinate and manage their respective responsibilities for the BioWatch Program  
through a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) and interagency agreements, which were 
crafted and signed in 2004.  The MOA, Appendix B, requires the following of the EPA: 
 Establishing, deploying, operating, and maintaining a network of 
collectors in BioWatch cities; 
 Establishing, operating, and maintaining a filter collection process for 
such a network; 
 
                                                 
8 House Committee on Homeland Security, Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, Science and Technology 
Subcommittee, One Year Later-Implementing the Biosurveillance Requirements of the 9/11 Act, Joint 
Statement of Robert Hooks, Eric Myers, and Jeffrey Stiefel, July 16, 2008, 
http://homeland.house.gov/Hearings/index.asp?ID=155 (accessed August 8, 2009), 7. 
9 Office of Inspector General, Homeland Security, DHS’ Management of the BioWatch Program, OIG-
07–22, January 2007, 2. 
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 Coordinating the monitoring activities of the network with state and local 
environmental monitoring agencies; and  
 Coordinating activities with CDC.10 
For the purposes of this paper, the third and fourth dot points are most critical.  
The EPA is expected to work and maintain relationships with state and local 
environmental agencies and coordinate with the CDC on the federal level.  According to 
the MOA, all entities are to be responsible to each other and provide information and 
reports on a regular basis.  However, the U.S. EPA and its partners were not following 
the MOA and reports were not submitted as outlined.11  The lack of communication 
between the agencies must have resulted in more confusion at the federal level, which 
was passed on to the state and local levels regarding BioWatch.   
The MOA goes on to require the CDC and its Laboratory Response Network 
(LRN) to provide technical expertise and services to the BioWatch Program including: 
 Providing laboratory analysis services; 
 Developing and implementing specific protocols for each laboratory that 
makes up the LRN and its designated as a laboratory responsible for 
BioWatch’s filter testing; 
 Coordinating activities with the EPA; 
 Provide leadership and technical assistance to state and local health 
department regarding the management of public health emergencies 
resulting from BioWatch’s detection of biological pathogens; and  
 Use funding only for specific items related to the BioWatch Program 
activities that are outlined–Materials, supplies, and personnel related to 
BioWatch’s laboratory staffing, diagnostic hardware, critical and specialty 
reagents, training, testing travel directly related to the BioWatch Program 
laboratory support and laboratory personnel evaluation.12 
The responsibilities outlined for the CDC in the MOA primarily address the LRN 
and funding related to the LRN.  The MOA also mentions coordination and support for 
the state and local public health departments; however, does not provide funding for  
                                                 
10 Office of Inspector General, Homeland Security, DHS’ Management of the BioWatch Program, 2. 
11 Ibid., 6. 
12 Ibid., 18. 
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administrative endeavors for public health addressed earlier and does not provide 
language for a strong leadership role for state health departments for needed public health 
oversight of the program. 
C. THESIS STRUCTURE 
This thesis is organized into four chapters to address a policy change in leadership 
or policy change from state EPA department/program to the state public health 
department/program and how should that change occur.  Chapter I introduces the 
problem, background of the BioWatch program, and a review of literature used in 
development of the thesis.  Chapter II outlines cases that emphasize the benefits of the 
BioWatch Program and demonstrates the necessity of the primary involvement of public 
health in leading policy for the program.  In this chapter, the primary makeup of 
attendees to BioWatch Program meetings is compared to support the argument of public 
health’s leadership role in the program.  Chapter III reviews possibilities for migration 
from the state EPA departments/programs taking the lead in administration of the 
BioWatch Program to the state pubic health department taking on the leadership role for 
training, education, and monitoring of the program.  Chapter IV addresses 
implementation hurdles, policy implications, and possible further research into solutions 
for the BioWatch Program.   
D. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
The author examined both governmental documents, such as after action reports 
provided by BioWatch cities that have experienced a positive sample and news articles as 
foundations for this research.  Many of the documents were deemed “For Official Use 
Only” and are not available for inclusion into this paper.  This hurdle does impact the 





The general description of the BioWatch Program is available in popular news 
articles as well as governmental documents.  The January 22, 2003 article, “Nationwide 
Monitoring System Planned for Detecting BioTerror Attack,” by the Associated Press,13 
“BioWarfare Monitors Are Deployed in U.S.,” in the January 23, 2003 Washington 
Post,14 and the Houston Chronicle article, “Government Touts Germ Alarm System,” 
published November 15, 2003,15 are only a few of the many that appeared in newspapers 
early after the President’s announcement. Additionally, there are articles that are 
available examining the problems associated with BioWatch and the criticism of the 
project, such as a Chicago Tribune article published on April 6, 2003, “City’s Air 
Monitored for Bioterror Attack: Early Detection System Criticized.”16 
A more reliable source describing the program can be found through the 
University of Minnesota’s Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy (CIDRAP) 
Internet Web page, www.cidrap.umn.edu.  CIDRAP is charged with providing support 
for the BioWatch program by assisting in defining the epidemiological planning aspects 
of the program as well as planning and conducting an annual BioWatch meeting for all 
cities that have BioWatch monitors.  Therefore, CIDRAP is charged with releasing 
official information regarding the BioWatch Program to the public as well as preparing 
confidential documents related to the program.17 
Documents related to events surrounding the BioWatch Program since its 
deployment in 2003 are primarily press releases and newspaper articles from BioWatch 
cities such as Houston and Washington, D.C.  The research pointed to several articles 
                                                 
13 Associated Press, “Nationwide Monitoring System Planned for Detecting Bioterror Attack,” 
January 22, 2003, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL32152.html (accessed September 10, 2007). 
14 Kathy Sawyer, “Biowarfare Monitors are Deployed in U.S.,” The Washington Post (Washington, 
D.C.), January 23, 2003. 
15 “Government Touts Germ Alarm System/’BioWatch’ in Houston, 30 Other Cities,” Houston 
Chronicle (Houston, TX), November 15, 2003, 
http://www.chron.com/CDA/archives/archive.mpl?id=2003_3708081 (accessed September 4, 2006). 
16 Julie Deardorff, “City’s Air Monitored for Bioterror Attack,” Chicago Tribune, April 6, 2003, 
http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/chicagotribune/access/321666171.html?dids=321666171:321 (accessed 
August 28, 2008). 
17 Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy, “Mission & Activities: Public Health and 
BioWatch,” http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/center/mission/articles/biow.html (accessed June 6, 2006). 
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regarding the first reported BioWatch positive “alarm” in October 2003, such as a press 
release on the City of Houston’s official Web site, “Officials Following Up on Bacteria 
Detection.”18  In addition, the Washington, D.C. BioWatch event in September 2005 also 
created a great deal of media coverage.  “Biohazard Sensors Triggered: Mall Germ 
Levels Likely Not a Threat,” appeared in the Washington Post on October 1, 2005 and 
described the event according to a press release by federal officials.19   
Government documents that provide insight to the management of the program 
exist through the Office of the Inspector General and through congressional record.  The 
Office of the Inspector General released two reports 11 months apart regarding the EPA’s 
responsibilities.  Other government documents include congressional testimony, reports 
by the Office of Inspector General, and documents produced by DHS committees and 
subcommittees. 
The government documents that are lacking are those that describe how the 
BioWatch Program management was set up and the overall vision for the program.  The 
documents available regarding the early inception of the program are briefly mentioned 
in President George W. Bush’s 2003 State of the Union address and some presidential 
directives, however, no details of the program’s set up were found.   
The information and documents that the author uses regarding the State of 
Missouri and the St. Louis BioWatch Network were obtained through meetings with 
partners at the federal and state levels including the; Missouri departments of Health and 
Senior Services, Public Safety, and Natural Resources; and, local public health and 
emergency response agencies.  As this thesis will be public release, the author was 
scrupulous in maintaining confidentiality as necessary. 
                                                 
18 City of Houston: The Official Site for Houston, “Officials Following up on Bacteria Detection,” 
http://www.houstontx.gov/health/NewsReleases/bacteria%20detection.html (accessed September 1, 2006). 
19 Martin Weil and Susan Levine, “Biohazard Sensors Triggered:  Mall Germ Levels Likely Not a 
Threat,” The Washington Post, October 1, 2005, 
http://pqash.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/access/905126611.html? (accessed September 3, 2006). 
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II. THE BIOWATCH PROGRAM PURPOSE REVEALED FROM 
PAST EVENTS 
A. SIGNIFICANCE BIOLOGICAL EVENTS BEFORE BIOWATCH 
A goal of the BioWatch Program is the detection of a large biological weapons 
grade release in an outdoor or indoor situation, such as subways or postal facilities that 
may cause thousands of casualties.  The early notification of such an attack presumably 
will provide a significant advantage in preventing and treating thousands of casualties, 
limiting illnesses and deaths by allowing earlier vaccination or pharmaceutical treatment 
to those exposed.20  Experts, however, have questioned whether a mass biological attack 
is the most probable terrorist threat or if a smaller localized attack is more likely to occur 
negating the effectiveness of BioWatch.21  However, there are historical examples of a 
large aerosolized outdoor release, the 1979 anthrax release at Sverdlovsk (now 
Ekaterinburg), Russia, and an indoor release, the U.S. anthrax mailings in 2001, 
suggesting that such incidents are plausible and making the BioWatch Program relevant 
and viable tool for public health officials.   
1. U.S. Anthrax Letters of 2001 
The letters containing anthrax were sent through the U.S. Postal system.  
According to Postal Service managers, public health officials, and postal worker union 
representatives, the Postal Service considered the health risks to its employees ahead of 
its mission to deliver the mail in deciding whether to close postal facilities.  The U.S. 
Postal Service relied on public health agencies to assess the health risks and to 
recommend treatment for its employees.  At the time of the event, agencies involved 
believed risk exposure to anthrax contained in the mail to be minimal.  It was not until the 
                                                 
20 Dana A. Shea and Sara Lister, The BioWatch Program: Detection of Bioterrorism, Congressional 
Research Service Report no. RL 32152, November 19, 2003, 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL32152.html (accessed August 9, 2009). 
21 Amy Smithson and Leslie-Anne Levy, Ataxia: The Chemical and Biological Terrorism Threat and 
the US Response (The Henry L. Stimson Center, Report no. 35, October 2000). 
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CDC confirmed cases of anthrax in postal employees at Trenton and Brentwood facilities 
that the seriousness of the event was realized.22  The Postal Service closed these 
facilities, worked closely with the CDC to provide treatment to those diagnosed with 
anthrax, and began prophylaxis for other employees that were in the facilities as a 
precautionary measure.  
Local public health agencies underestimated the health risks to postal employees 
because they were not experienced with military grade anthrax and did not suspect that 
anthrax spores could leak from taped, unopened letters in sufficient quantities and cause 
deaths.  In addition, the CDC, as well as other federal agencies, had no experience with 
the grade of anthrax that was contained in the letters nor had experience with the 
equipment that was used in the U.S. Postal Service distribution centers, equipment that 
“pinched” the letters and sent them through a sorting system at very high speeds.  The 
CDC and the Postal Service have said they would have made different decisions if they 
had earlier understood the health risks to postal employees.23  The decisions made early 
on during the anthrax letter event caused confusion, concern, and distrust in 
governmental officials, including public health officials at federal and state levels. 
The anthrax letters of 2001 were sent through the postal system in September and 
October.  The FBI believes that there were a total of four letters sent.  Two of the letters 
were postmarked September 18 to the New York Post and to Tom Brokaw at NBC in New 
York.  Letters to Senators Tom Daschel and Patrick Leahy were postmarked October 9.24  
There were confirmed human cases of anthrax at America Media in Florida and at the 
New York offices of CBS and ABC; however, the FBI does not believe anthrax letters 
were sent to these facilities, but that cross-contamination occurred from the four letters 
mentioned above.25  Five people died from anthrax during this period of time and of the 
people who contracted anthrax, eleven worked for the postal service and eight for media 
                                                 
22 General Accounting Office, Bioterrorism: Public Health Response to Anthrax Incidents of 2001 
(GAO–04–152, October 2003), 11. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Council on Foreign Relations, Backgrounder: The Anthrax Letters, 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/9555/ (accessed September 16, 2009). 
25 Ibid. 
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organizations, and an infant visiting her mother at ABC News in New York also fell ill.  
Three other people—a bookkeeper in New Jersey, a nurse in New York City, and an 
elderly widow in rural Connecticut—also caught anthrax.  The nurse and the widow 
died.26   
The indoor release of anthrax described above demonstrates the importance of 
detecting a release of a biological agent as soon as possible and the fact that a grade of 
anthrax that could be aerosolized that could cause illness and death was available to 
someone who was willing to use it with the general public.  It is conceivable that if the 
anthrax release was detected when the letter(s) was going through the postal facility less 
cross contamination would have occurred, fewer individuals would have fallen ill or died, 
and pharmaceutical treatment of postal workers would have immediately been given 
assistance in saving lives and reducing illness.   
2. Anthrax Release: Sverdlovsk, Russia–1979 
In April and May 1979, an unusual anthrax epidemic occurred in Sverdlovsk, 
Russia among humans and livestock.  Soviet officials at the time attributed the outbreak 
to consumption of contaminated meat.  Articles appearing in early 1980 in Soviet Union 
medical, veterinary, and legal journals reported an anthrax outbreak among livestock 
south of the city in the spring of 1979 and stated that human cases of gastrointestinal 
anthrax resulted from eating contaminated meat and cutaneous anthrax cases occurred 
after contact with diseased animals.27  In 1986, scientists from the U.S. were invited to 
come to Moscow for discussions with Soviet physicians who had gone to Sverdlovsk to 
deal with the anthrax outbreak.  In 1988, two of the Soviet physicians that were a part of 
the 1986 discussions visited the U.S., provided formal presentations, and participated in 
discussions with private and U.S. government specialists.  According to their account, 
contaminated animals and meat from an epizootic south of the city starting in late March  
 
 
                                                 
26 Council on Foreign Relations, Backgrounder: The Anthrax Letters. 
27 Matthew Meselson, “The Sverdlovsk Anthrax Outbreak of 1979,” Science 266 (1994): 1202–1208. 
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1979 caused 96 cases of human anthrax with onsets from April 4 to May 18, 1979.  Of 
these cases, 79 were said to be gastrointestinal and 17 cutaneous, with 64 deaths among 
the gastrointestinal cases and none among the cutaneous cases.28   
In the early 1990s, the Russian media began to release articles related to the 
Sverdlovsk anthrax cases.  The articles included interviews with Sverdlovsk physicians 
who questioned the food borne explanation of the epidemic and with officials at the 
military microbiology facility.  These officials admitted that in 1979 they had been 
developing an improved vaccine against anthrax but knew of no escape of the anthrax 
pathogen.  In late 1991, Russian President Boris Yeltsin, who in 1979 was the chief 
Communist Party official of the Sverdlovsk region, directed his Counselor for Ecology 
and Health to determine the origin of the epidemic.  In May 1992, Yeltsin stated that the 
KGB admitted that the Soviet military research regarding military grade anthrax as a 
biological weapon and vaccines related to the agent was related to the cause of the 
release.29  The timeline outlines the milestones surrounding the event over a 14-year 
period. 
 April/May 1979–Anthrax illness/deaths occur among humans and animals 
 November 1979–West German, Anti-Soviet Magazine breaks the story 
 June 1980–Soviet news agency TASS claimed the source of the outbreak 
was contaminated meat 
 1980–1990 Soviets defended story related to contaminated meat 
 1991–Sverdlovsk name changed to Ekaterinburg 
 1992–1993 U.S.-led investigation confirmed it was not a food borne 
outbreak 
The data collected was collected in the early 1990s by U.S. scientists with 
assistance from Russian health officials.  The sources of information were gathered from 
data compiled by the KGB including an administrative list giving names, birth years, and 
residence address of the 68 people who died, household interviews with family and 
friends of those who died and survivors that were designed to determine place of 
                                                 
28 Meselson, “The Sverdlovsk Anthrax Outbreak of 1979,” 1202. 
29 Ibid., 1202–1203. 
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employment and other places individuals may have been before their illness, hospital 
lists, clinical case histories, and other data.  With this data, the researchers were able to 
create a plum map by plotting cases on a 1979 regional map of Sverdlovsk (see Figure 2). 
Scientists used case numbers for fatalities as they appeared on the administrative list.  
Days of onset and death are counted from April 1, 1979.30 
 
 
Figure 2.   Sverdlovsk Plume Model. 
The data from Sverdlovsk and Figure 2 are still studied today by BioWatch 
experts and the public health community for its application to a city such as St. Louis.  
The modeling and the data are critical in understanding an aerosol release of a biological 
agent and gives real-life data on deaths, illnesses, weather impact on aerosolized releases, 
and time lapse of onset of illness after the event for this particular agent.  It is critical to 
note at this point that the BioWatch Program was created to assist federal, state, and local 
agencies to detect such releases as the pluming effect, demonstrated in Figure 2, 
immediately to save lives by providing early treatment to the population affected and 
information to the general public as to how to protect themselves and their families 
                                                 
30 Meselson, “The Sverdlovsk Anthrax Outbreak of 1979,” 1202–1203. 
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during, or immediately after, the event.  The plumbing and plotting cases on the plume 
graph are critical in convincing officials that consequence management planning related 
to the BioWatch Program is important.  It also supports the argument that the 
accountability for the planning and the day-to-day administration of the program is 
critical since consequence management of such a release requires strong leadership and 
program monitoring from the agency that provides public health policy.  The Sverdlovsk 
case demonstrated how cases cluster as well as timing related to onset and death, giving 
information related to reaction time.  The concern is if military grade anthrax, similar to 
what was mailed in the anthrax letters of 2001, can be aerosolized and dispersed over a 
city the size of St. Louis the Sverdlovsk, Russia data becomes significant and helps 
provide estimates of the casualties. 
The Sverdlovsk, Russia incident and the anthrax letters in the U.S. provides 
evidence of several situations surrounding controversial issues among politicians, which 
favor silence and pretending nothing is wrong to avoid social and economic concern, 
public health, which favors full, early disclosure and discussions, and the general public 
and are especially important to the BioWatch Program including: 
 Earlier detection of the anthrax release in a situation similar to that in 
Sverdlovsk, Russia.  The BioWatch Program used with other public health 
tools such as syndromic surveillance can be used to determine what type 
of release was made within the confines of agents tested in a timelier 
manner so that prophylaxis can begin as early as possible.  The Sverdlovsk 
release took place in a city of approximately 1.2 million people and there 
were a reported sixty-four deaths.31  A similar release could occur in a city 
such as St. Louis, which has the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) of 
approximately 2.8 million individual and can have a much larger impact 
depending on how the release was dispensed.  The earlier the release is 
detected the more lives that can be saved. 
 Public campaigns regarding the diseases that are regularly tested for can 
be developed before an event occurs so that it is ready to be released to the 
public and health care providers on a moments notice.  The anthrax letters 
caused great concern among those with potential exposure and those 
coming into contact with them.  Early released information campaigns can 
explain, for example, that anthrax is not transmitted from human to human 
like other agents, such as smallpox. 
                                                 
31 Meselson, “The Sverdlovsk Anthrax Outbreak of 1979,” 1202–1203. 
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 Politicians and public health professionals may clash in cases where a 
release is detected.  Public health professionals concern is the health and 
welfare of individuals and will err on the side of caution when a detection 
is initially occurred.  Politicians, on the other hand, may be more sensitive 
to the economic and political ramifications of a false negative and may 
want to keep information concealed until more definite information is 
known. 
3. Summary of Relevant Cases 
Looking at the two incidents in tandem reveals several key issues that are a must 
for the BioWatch Program: 
 A detection mechanism, such as the BioWatch Program, can assist public 
health officials and political leaders with insight and warning in large 
cities and indoor events of great significance, such as super bowl, political 
presidential conventions, subway systems, and indoor arenas that an event 
has occurred that is not of a natural origin. 
 When biological agents are released in the air deaths and casualties will 
occur causing the public to look to government officials, especially public 
health for guidance on disease.  As shown in the anthrax case, public 
health/CDC is the go to agency, not the EPA. 
The aerosolized release in Russia provides evidence of a Soviet block biological 
warfare program.  President Yeltsin admitted to the world that the cases in Russia were a 
direct result from an unintentional release of anthrax spores from a Soviet biological 
weapons facility.  This admission alleviates any doubt that countries can and have 
experimented with biological weapons and leaves plenty of room for the possibility that 
U.S. enemies can still be producing biological military agents.  Second, the fact that 
anthrax, or other biological agents, can be mailed and cause illness and even death 
through direct contact with the contaminated piece of mail as well as through cross-
contamination of pieces of mail that came into contact with the contaminated letters or 
machinery that processed the mail.  Third, biological attacks can be executed indoors as 
well as outdoors.  Fourth, the longer a biological release is unknown the more casualties 
and illnesses will occur.  The unknown factor can keep public health officials guessing 
and can lead to unclear instructions to the general public and health care officials, causing 
confusion and distrust of governmental officials. 
 20
The BioWatch Program was placed in the largest cities in the U.S. to assist in 
detecting aerosolized biological agents such as anthrax, to provide the earliest warning 
possible so that public health officials can start lifesaving mass prophylaxis as early as 
possible.  In the case of the anthrax letters and the Sverdlovsk incident, the BioWatch 
Program could have improved the situation by alerting authorities to the release of a 
biological agent, hopefully prompting earlier vaccines and pharmaceutical treatment, 
saving lives and deterring illness.  However, in order for such an early warning system to 
be effective, clear strategies, policies and response measures need to be in place.  If they 
are not, the system can actually worsen the situation and degrade response because: clear 
messages are not available to the general public; governmental agencies will not have 
consistent messaging; health care agencies will be at a loss as to what to do with the 
influx of patients without clear public health guidance; and, as time continues, the public 
will distrust all information coming from governmental officials.   
B. CURRENT BIOWATCH PROGRAM OVERVIEW 
During the 2003 State of the Union Address, President George W. Bush 
announced the BioWatch Program by declaring, “We’ve…begun inoculating troops and 
first responders against smallpox, and are deploying the nation’s first early warning 
network of sensors to detect a biological attack,” emphasizing the importance of the 
program at the federal level and the particular interest of those in the White House.32  At 
this moment, there was no doubt that the BioWatch Program would be placed in U.S. 
cites and would be operational despite criticisms.  Jacqueline Cattani, Director of the 
Center for Biological Defense at the University of South Florida, was quoted as saying, 
“It’s crazy.  We don’t see how random air sampling can cover a large area effectively.  
To pick up a potential exposure to a biological agent by air monitoring or other sensor-
type technology, you’d have to be extremely lucky.”33  However, in spite of the 
                                                 
32 “State of the Union Address,” Executive Office of the President, The White House, January 28, 
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naysayers, the path to the BioWatch Program was becoming a reality before the 2003 
State of the Union Address during the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
During the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City, Utah, a system called the 
Biological Aerosol Sentry and Information System (BASIS) was tested as a precursor to 
the BioWatch Program.  BASIS, developed under the Chemical and Biological National 
Security Program of the National Nuclear Security Administration by Livermore and Los 
Alamos scientists, involved the placement of fifteen to twenty monitoring stations in 
various locations in the Salt Lake City region.  The filters were collected and transported 
to the U.S. Department of Energy laboratory every four hours and tested for the presence 
of CDC’s Category A Agents.  Before BASIS was used in Salt Lake City, it was field 
tested in urban environments.34  The effectiveness of BASIS is discussed later in this 
chapter. 
Since BASIS and the 2002 Winter Olympic Games, the BioWatch Program has 
been established and deployed to over thirty cities across the United States.  The program 
was developed, funded, and managed by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s 
Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate and carried out in cooperation with the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) on the federal level.35  BioWatch uses environmental sampling devices 
to detect biological pathogens quickly, such as anthrax, to assist public officials in 
recognizing a biological event so that lifesaving medications may be distributed to 
affected citizens as early as possible.   
It is important to note at this point that “quickly” in the case of BioWatch 
Program is not immediate.  The samples must be collected and taken to a laboratory 
where tests are runt to check for all of the agents of concern.  The first Polymerase Chain 
Reaction (PCR) screening assay is completed soon after the sample arrives at the  
 
                                                 
34 CIDRAP, “BioWatch Program Aims for Nationwide Detection of Airborne Pathogens,” (February 
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35 House Committee on Science, An Overview of the Federal Budget R&D Budget for FY 2005, 108th 
Cong., 2d sess., February 11, 2004, 67.  
 22
laboratory; normally, the testing is completed within two to six hours.  If the PCR 
screening test is reactive, a PCR confirmatory assay must be performed on the sample, 
which takes another two to six hours depending on the laboratory. 
The PCR positive test result is only the beginning of finding the agent’s source 
and determining if it is a terrorist event or a naturally occurring event.  The data found 
from the PCR positive then must be considered with other public health data that is 
collected on a daily basis by state and local public health department.  The most 
important data collection and notation is from direct physician contact voicing a concern 
regarding a cluster of patients and a data collection system known as syndromic 
surveillance.  
Before going further, it is important to define syndromic surveillance and its 
importance.  Since the 2001 anthrax attacks, “syndromic surveillance” has many 
definitions.  For the purposes of this paper, the CDC definition of “syndromic 
surveillance” will be used:  syndromic surveillance is constant surveillance using health-
related data that precede diagnosis and signal a sufficient probability of a case or an 
outbreak to warrant further public health response. Although, historically, syndromic 
surveillance has been utilized to target investigation of potential cases, its utility for 
detecting outbreaks associated with bioterrorism is increasingly being explored by public 
health officials.  Syndromic surveillance is distinguished from other methods of 
surveillance by the data types monitored as potential indicators of a disease or outbreak.  
For the purpose of detecting bioterrorism, indicators are nonspecific expressions of the 
target diseases that occur before a diagnosis would routinely be made.  These indicators 
may include absenteeism from work or school, purchases of over-the-counter health 
products such as facial tissues, orange juice, allergy medicine and cold medicines, 
laboratory test requests, or visits to a health-care facility with, for example, symptoms 
indicating upper respiratory infection.36 
The data described above must be identified, grouped, and analyzed in such a way 
that is logical and provides the best information to public health professionals as possible.  
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This step in the syndromic surveillance process is critical and must be done with care and 
quickly in order for early intervention to occur.  A timeline must be developed that 
includes exposure, symptom onset, health behavior, health care encounter, medical 
evaluation, initial findings, and final diagnosis, for example.  The problem with 
syndromic surveillance is that it is useless on its own unless there is intelligence 
regarding an attack, which BioWatch can assist in confirming.  The BioWatch filters that 
may present a positive can be coupled with syndromic surveillance that will include 
patients that may present early to physicians with symptoms because of weakened 
immune systems.  Without BioWatch information, there is no way to know that an attack 
has occurred until individuals show signs and symptoms in large clusters.  In the 
treatment of many agents of concern, when symptoms appear the survival rate is lowered 
considerably.  Table 1 describes the CDC’s Category A agents’ public health impact and 
resistance to medical treatment. 
 




Pneumonic Plague causes 
fever, headache, weakness, 
and rapidly developing 
pneumonia with shortness 
of breath, chest pain, and 
cough.  The pneumonia 
progresses for 2 to 4 days 
and may cause respiratory 
failure and shock.  Without 
early treatment, 90% of the 
patients die. 
Plague can often be treated 
with antibiotics, but only if 
given within the first 24 
hours. 
 24




Anthrax has a 1–7 day 
incubation period.  Onset of 
severe symptoms occurs 
within 2–5 days of 
incubation.  Hospitalization 
is often required for those 
showing disease symptoms.  
Unvaccinated, untreated 
individuals with inhalation 
anthrax suffer up to 90% 
fatalities.37 
Anthrax responds well to 
antibiotic therapy.  The 
recover rate is 70 percent if 





respiratory failure, shock 
and death.  The mortality 
rate of tularemia without 
antibiotics treatment has 
been as high as 30%–60%. 
With treatment, the fatality 
rate falls to 2%. 




Smallpox is recognizable by 
a widespread, full body 
rash.  If treated smallpox 
has a greater than 30% 
fatality rate among 
unvaccinated populations.   
Vaccine given within 72 
hours of exposure reduces 
disease severity.  There is 
no other treatment for 
smallpox. 
It is important to note that 
smallpox was eradicated 
before antivirals and other 
modern medicines were 
invented.  The data on hand 
is only from before 1975. 
                                                 
37 Note: This number is based on what is known from data before the fall of 2001 anthrax letters. It is 
possible with new treatment and hospital care the rate may be lower, however, there is no significant data 
to support the assumption. 
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Ingestion of botulinum 
toxin causes difficulty 
speaking, seeing and/or 
swallowing, leading to 
increasing paralysis that 
may include respiratory 
paralysis.  Recover from 
paralysis can take from 
weeks to months.  
Inhalation of botulinum 
toxin causes more rapid 
onset of symptoms. 
Exposure to botulium toxin 
can be treated with 
antitoxin.  This treatment 
stops further damage, but 
does not reverse current 
paralysis.  Mechanical 
breathing assistance and 
supportive care are required 
in acute cases. 
Hemorrhagic fevers There are many types of 
hemorrhagic fevers 
including, Machupo, 
Bolivia, Ebola and 
Marburg.  Symptoms for 
hemorrhagic fevers range 
from fever, headache, sore 
throat, diarrhea, internal and 
external bleeding, shock, 
and liver failure. The 
fatality rates range from 
50%–90% for Ebola to 5%–
30% for Machupo.   
For most hemorrhagic 
fevers, there is no specific 
treatment.  Only supportive 
care can be provided.   
Table 1.   Biological Agent Characteristics38 
The BioWatch Program is designed to be a component of daily public health 
surveillance to complement and refine syndromic surveillance that some states, Missouri 
being one, are now doing electronically.  The detection of a covert act of bioterrorism, 
unless detected by the BioWatch Program, is likely to occur only through syndromic 
surveillance or an astute physician.  The BioWatch Program adds another system that can 
provide evidence that a release has occurred, making available an additional tool to 
public health in order to alert health providers on the ground with specific instructions 
                                                 
38 Dana A. Shea and Frank Gottron, CRS Report for Congress, Small-scale Terrorist Attacks Using 
Chemical and Biological Agents: An Assessment Framework and Preliminary Comparisons, May 20, 2004, 
65–76. 
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before a patient has presented with signs and symptoms.  Thus, detection is delayed from 
the time the event occurs to when individuals develop signs and symptoms.  Therefore, 
even though “fast” is a qualified statement, since BioWatch takes time for lab processing, 
it is still much faster than the alternative. 
Figure 3 gives a pictorial of the importance of the timeline when detecting a 
biological event.  Note that the “Biological Sensors” will detect the event before 
syndromic surveillance begins to see clustering of symptoms.  In order to make the public 
health detection system work more effectively, public health officials at the state and 
local levels must be intimately involved in the BioWatch planning and leadership efforts 
and have rapid access to BioWatch findings.   
 
 
Figure 3.   Disease Intervention.39 
                                                 
39 Kenneth Mandl et al., “Implementing Syndromic Surveillance: A Practical Guide Informed by the 
Early Experience,” Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association 11 (March/April 2004): 143. 
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Despite its difficult beginnings, the BioWatch Program has gained public and 
Congressional interest for several reasons, including its relevance to syndromic 
surveillance, the possibility of early detection of disease, its high price tag, and the 
promise of future development of sensors that transmit readings to laboratories without 
the tedious collection of filters and indoor systems with alarms that can alert individuals 
immediately when a biological agent has been detected.  The reasons for congressional 
interest listed above directly translate into increases in the Homeland Security Research 
and Development (R&D) budget.  BioWatch is responsible for the majority of a 15 
percent increase in Homeland Security R&D at the Department of Homeland Security.  
The 2005 Homeland Security R&D budget received approximately a $104 million 
increase from fiscal year 2004.  The entire increase was directed toward biological 
countermeasure activities, including the expansion of BioWatch coverage in highly 
populated cities and piloting an integrated warning and assessment system for biological 
attacks.40  
The currently-deployed BioWatch Program, known as Phase I, detects six of the 
top threats from the CDC’s A and B lists, some of which are listed in Table 2.  This 
includes anthrax, tularemia, and smallpox.  To date, not all the agents that BioWatch tests 
for have been made public.  Advanced detection systems, now under development, will 
increase the number detected.  It is believed that the program will reasonably detect more 
than twenty high-threat agents, including markers for antibiotic resistant and engineered 
organisms by 2009.41  The ultimate goal is to have the BioWatch sensors deployed so 
that eighty percent of the  U.S. population will be living in areas monitored by the 
equipment.42 
While serving the primary function of mitigating attacks, the BioWatch Program 
as well as other detection programs, plays a significant role in deterrence.  Logically, 
terrorist may be less likely to attack when they know that defensive systems prevent them 
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41 Ibid., 154. 
42 CIDRAP, “BioWatch Program Aims for Nationwide Detection of Airborne Pathogens.” 
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from attaining their goals.43  Thus, the BioWatch Program and the advancement of its 
technology are unlikely to be discontinued.  Therefore, it is vital to assess the entire 
program and make changes, as needed, to improve the program in order to make it more 
efficient and practical in the future. 
The information in this section shows the value of public health’s input and 
continuous monitoring of the BioWatch Program.  The state and local public health 
agencies are designed to work together to provide surveillance and disease planning and 
therefore should work together and answer to each other for this program as much as any 
other program that is disease related.   
Debate among public health and scientists since the deployment of BioWatch 
included the ability of the sensors to pick up naturally occurring bacterium.  In addition, 
if the sensor did pick up naturally occurring bacterium how would officials and 
laboratory officials distinguish between natural and manmade.  Additionally, how will 
officials know when to announce the BioWatch positive to the public?  Moreover, if 
announced to the public and it is only a naturally occurring event, how will the public 
react to the unnecessary panic caused?   
C. HISTORY OF BIOWATCH ALARMS SINCE PLACED IN U.S. CITIES 
1. Salt Lake City, Utah–2002 Winter Olympics 
During the 2002 Winter Olympic Games, one PCR positive caused some concern 
through an ambient air program that was deployed for the Olympic Games and before 
BioWatch was placed in U.S. cities.  On February 12, 2002, a sample collected at the 
airport was positive on more than one single-strand test.  The airport was alerted by 
officials and was warned that they may need to evacuate.  However, before the final 
decision to evacuate, airport officials decided to wait on follow-up testing, which 
consequently showed that the organism was a nonpathogenic organism.44 
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While awaiting the results of the confirmatory testing, the airport started 
preparing to close and hazardous-materials teams were suiting up for possible duty.  
There are no open sources that indicate that consequence management and mass 
prophylaxis plans were in place in case a positive sample was detected.  Evidence has 
shown that public health was involved with the incident since Scott Williams, the Deputy 
Director of the Utah Department of Health, was the spokesperson for the potential 
positive; however, he did not have a lead role in the event nor was contacted early on in 
the event.  Williams also noted that there was no preparation for the air monitoring 
system through tabletop exercises or other scenarios that were executed before the 
Olympics.45  Thus, it is reasonable to deduce that Olympic security partners were not as 
prepared as needed for a biological release.  Additionally, from the information that is 
available in public sources, it appears that partners may have not taken the possibility of a 
biological attack seriously since tabletop scenarios did not address a positive BioWatch 
filter and it was not discussed with public health officials before the Olympics. 
2. Houston, Texas 
The first incident of a positive BioWatch result after the program was deployed in 
U.S. cities was reported on October 9, 2003 in Houston, Texas.  The Houston Department 
of Health and Human Services reported detecting low levels of the bacterium that causes 
tularemia, Francisella tularensis.46  According to a media release, positive results were 
detected on three consecutive days, October 4, 5, and 6, 2003, with negative results on 
subsequent days.47  The response to the positive result was a modest one: Precautionary 
measures were taken by the local and state public health agencies, including increased 
surveillance for human illness; additional environmental sampling and testing; and 
assessment of activities in the area that may have caused the sensors to pick up the 
organism.  There were no signs that the presence of the bacterium resulted from an 
intentional release; rather, it was naturally occurring. 
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The city of Houston began syndromic surveillance for signs and symptoms of 
tularemia while follow-up collection of filters and testing of those filters and collection 
and testing of rabbits and rodents, which are natural carriers of tularemia, were being 
completed.  There were no human cases of tularemia that were found during the time 
period in question, after a three- to five-day incubation period.48   
Health officials were involved with media releases and messaging to the public.  
The City of Houston’s news release reported, “Precautionary measures being taken by the 
City of Houston's Health and Human Services Department and Harris County Public 
Health and Environmental Services include increased surveillance for human illness, 
additional environmental sampling, collection and testing of wild rabbits and rodents and 
an assessment of activities in the area that may have caused the sensors to pick up the 
organism.”49   
What we do not know from the newspaper articles and other open documents are 
the interactions between state and local officials and state EPA departments and the state 
and city public health departments.  Those items have been discussed in closed sessions 
and are not available for unlimited publication. 
The October 2003 BioWatch positive was closely monitored by all BioWatch 
cities since it was the first positive alarm to occur.  Many were doubtful that the 
BioWatch sensors would actually do what they were designed to do.  Other public heath 
officials were concerned that the sensors would read positive much of the time because 
many of the agents being tested are naturally occurring and would cause unnecessary 
concern and panic.  The Houston positive samples were the sentinel events that public 
health, environmental professionals, and governmental officials were waiting for since 
the BioWatch Program was released to the original cities after the 2002 Winter Olympic 
Games.   
                                                 
48 CIDRAP, “Signs of Tularemia Agent Detected in Houston Air.” 
49 City of Houston: The Official Site for Houston, “Officials Following up on Bacteria Detection.”  
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3. Washington, DC 
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention notified the states of Maryland 
and Virginia and the District of Columbia on September 30, 2005, that an airborne form 
of tularemia bacterium was detected by six air sensors in the National Capitol Mall area 
during the weekend of September 24–25, 2006.50  A week after the detection of the 
tularemia bacterium, there were no signs of illness that would result from the exposure 
and the event was determined to be most likely occurring naturally in the environment.51 
The activities surrounding the Washington, D.C. event unfortunately exposed 
gaps between systems and partners in the BioWatch Network in the nation’s capitol, and 
was discussed openly in the media.  Public health officials were not notified for five days 
that BioWatch had a positive alarm in the Mall.  According to media reports, the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security delayed alerting the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention because subsequent tests were not conclusive.52  As a result, state and local 
public health officials were not alerted and no planning actions were taken to ensure that 
anti-war rally participants at the Mall during the time of the positive samples, as well as 
tourists that visit the area on a daily basis, were notified.  This incident gave health care 
professionals serious pause and concern.  Public health professionals began to question 
how countless individuals that may eventually scatter across the U.S. and the world 
would be notified of a possible biological release and where to go for disease 
investigation and treatment.  This example demonstrates that the lack of consistent 
reporting mandates between agencies is inefficient for the BioWatch Program and may 
cause delay in saving lives at the local level.  The need for a leadership role of the state 
and local health departments in the BioWatch Program is evident from this example. 
                                                 
50 Weil and Levine, “Biohazard Sensors Triggered: Mall Germ Levels Likely not a Threat.”  
51 Petula Dvorak, “Health Officials Vigilant for Illness After Sensors find Biohazard on Mall,” The 
Washington Post, http://pquasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/access/905365901.html? (accessed 
October 2, 2005). 
52 Susan Levine and Sari Horwitz, “Test Results Cited in Delay of Mall Alert,” The Washington Post, 
October 5, 2005, http://pquasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/access/906716421.html (accessed 
September 3, 2006). 
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4. St. Louis, Missouri 
A routine BioWatch detected F. Tularensis in St. Louis, Missouri.  The positive 
filter was collected on October 17, 2006 near Busch Stadium.  However, follow-up tests 
on subsequent filters found no evidence of the bacteria that causes tularemia.53   
This particular positive result, however, may have caused concern among public 
health officials because of the location of the filter.  In October 2006, the St. Louis 
Cardinals played in the National Baseball League Playoffs on October 14, 15, and 17, 
and in the World Series on October 24, 25, and 27 in Busch Stadium in downtown St. 
Louis.  There is no open source to determine how or if the fact the National Baseball 
Playoffs or the 2006 World Series being played in Busch Stadium had an impact on the 
response efforts to the BioWatch positive.  However, the news media did report to the 
location of the sensor that provided the positive sample, which is not protocol for the 
BioWatch program and against protocols of the Missouri Department of Health and 
Senior Services,.  The St. Louis Post Dispatch reported, “A routine test of air quality near 
Busch Stadium on Monday turned up traces of a rare and potentially fatal bacteria that 
federal officials have warned could be used by terrorists as a biological weapon.”54  
Therefore, knowing where the positive was discovered would lead one to believe that 
there was considerable concern for the playoff games. 
It is unknown how the information regarding the location of the sensor leaked, 
however, it was not in the Missouri Department of Health’s media release and no local 
public health agency had knowledge of the mention of the sensor site.  The leak, 
however, emphasized some issues related to the BioWatch Program and the 
misunderstandings and lack of communication between partners at the federal, state, and 
local levels and emphasizes the importance of how BioWatch Program reporting and 
leadership must have a strong definition and policies.  The leadership developed and 
policies must be followed by all involved in order for leaks such as this that can 
complicate matters with response and consequence management.  
                                                 
53 Metro Digest, “Air-quality Test Finds Rare Bacteria,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, October 18, 2006 
http://stltoday.com/help/archives/simplesearch, (accessed August 14, 2009). 
54 Ibid. 
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In addition to the sensor, location leak the BioWatch positive for F. Tularensis 
was met with several other challenges.  The Missouri BioWatch Program had several 
issues that many other BioWatch cities have faced according to the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security’s Office of Inspector General report “DHS’ Management of 
BioWatch Program.  The report describes several issues plaguing BioWatch Programs in 
the report. 
 Improper transfer of exposed filters 
 Improper decontamination of the Chain-of-Custody bags, inner bags, and 
holders 
 Procedural errors made in the handoff from the field personnel to the 
laboratory personnel 
 Improper quality control55 
In addition, there was confusion between state departments and the role that each 
would take during the Missouri BioWatch process.  The entity assigned to transporting 
samples that were collected outside of normal collection times was not aware of all their 
responsibilities.  The Department of Natural Resources (DNR), Missouri’s department 
that is similar to the U.S. EPA was responsible for the day-to-day collection of samples, 
but did not completely understand their role in collections taken outside normal collection 
times and was not able to get clear guidance from the U.S. DHS.  The local public health 
agencies had not exercised using extra collection kits provided by DNR and were 
unfamiliar with procedures. 
Despite the many things that needed improvement, some things did go well for 
Missouri.  The notification calls of the BioWatch Advisory Committee were completed in 
a timely manner and a conference call with federal, state, and local officials was 
successful, the extra samples were taken and made their way to the Missouri State Public 
Health Laboratory for testing, and federal, state, and local officials agreed on the who 
would be the spokesperson for the event, and decisions were made quickly and 
effectively.56   
                                                 
55 DHS’ Management of the BioWatch Program, 5. 
56 This information is from personal notes from the author. 
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In summary of the numbered items above, the BioWatch Program has had several 
problems to overcome and still has many with which to deal.  The cities above that have 
had BioWatch positive results on a filter have struggled with issues similar to Missouri’s.  
In each of the examples, it is evident that public health agencies are anxious to take on a 
role in the BioWatch Program and want to ensure planning is in place and that the 
planning efforts are appropriate through exercises and multi-discipline partnerships.  
Issues that are relative to all of the BioWatch cities and continue to be areas of concern 
between EPA and public health programs are the following. 
 Location of sensors and if the best locations have been selected for the 
purpose of BioWatch 
 What are the guidelines of collecting samples when there has been a 
positive sensor?  How do we protect those that are collecting the samples 
to determine if there is a wide spread release without alarming the general 
public?  For example, do the sample collectors go out in full gear 
depending on the agent or do they continue to collect samples without gear 
until a confirmation? 
 At what point is the general public, health care professionals, and hospital 
staff notified of the potential release?   
 How and who is to fund the planning and exercise efforts for the 
BioWatch Program when there is limited funding for equipment and 
supplies, which is provided to the laboratories? 
 How does the public health preparedness efforts dovetail into BioWatch 
planning and exercises?  What role does the Cities Readiness Initiative, 
Strategic National Stockpile, and the Hospital Preparedness Program in 
the BioWatch Program and how to ensure the programs support each 
other. 
These and other questions and problems are still prominent in BioWatch cites and 
burden planning processes.   
D. PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION ANALYSIS–PUBLIC HEALTH 
NATIONAL TRENDS IN THE BIOWATCH PROGRAM  
Since the program began in 33 cities across the U.S. in 2002, there have been five 
national meetings: 2003, 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008.  In addition, the DHS is 
contracting with CIDRAP to host and plan regional meetings so that cities may work  
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together on a more intimate basis to share information, strategies, policies, and lessons 
learned over the past year.  It is through the general information of these meetings and the 
facts that they bring that analysis has occurred for this subject.   
The BioWatch Program’s first national meeting was in 2003 and there is no data 
from this session available for the analysis.  The program was very new at that time and 
many individuals involved are no longer involved.   
The DHS has provided national meetings for BioWatch participants for five years.  
As indicated above information regarding attendants is not available for the first program 
and for the 2007 and 2008 meetings are not available due to lack of the availability of a 
participant list, however, details of the second and third national meetings are in Table 2.  
Table 2 clearly shows the numbers and percentages of attendance by profession.  In 2005 
and 2006, participation by the state health departments was 19 and 16 percent more 
respectively than the state EPA departments.  In addition, local public health provided 13 
percent more than its EPA counterpart in 2005 and 24 percent more in 2006.  Nationally, 
the data shows that the BioWatch Program has a significant affect on public health at the 
state and local levels, however, there is no responsibility or accountability required of the 
state health agency in the process.  However, the state and local public health 
departments are struggling to take leadership as needed but have no authority to do so at 
the state and local levels.   


































91 24% 89 21% 
Local Health 
Agency 
68 18% 120 29% 
U.S. EPA 46 12% 40 10% 
State EPA 
Department 
17 5% 20 5% 






137 36% 123 30% 
TOTAL 378  415  
Table 2.   2005 and 2006 National Meeting Attendees 
In addition to the National BioWatch meetings, the DHS BioWatch Program has 
contracted with CIDRAP to provide regional programs.  The participant representation 
from the 2007 regional programs is listed in Table 3.  The data is presented here as 
aggregate data in order to maintain sensitive information related to the BioWatch 
Program.57  This data reflects the data from the national meetings.  A majority of the 
attendees, 33 percent, are from state health departments followed closely by local public  
 
 
                                                 
57 The data described in Table 4 was calculated from the Meeting Participant List provided by 
CIDRAP for each of the regional meetings. The names of the individuals are not available for the general 
public due to sensitive issues related to the BioWatch Program. The data in Table 4 is also missing data 
from two regional meetings because the meetings had not taken place or the Meeting Participant List was 
not available to the author. However, it is unlikely that the participant lists from these meetings would show 
significant differences in the professions attending the meetings. 
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health agencies at 31 percent. The federal, state, and local EPA participant groups came 
in at 3 percent each, showing again that the primary interest and planning efforts are with 




2007 REGIONAL BIOWATCH 
NATIONAL MEETING–
NUMBER ATTENDING 
˜ % OF TOTAL 
State Health Department 130 33% 
Local Health Agency 122 31% 
U.S. EPA 10 3% 
State EPA Department 13 3% 






TOTAL 393  
Table 3.   2007 Regional Meeting Attendees 
In addition to the participants, the agendas for the BioWatch Regional meetings 
are reflective of the BioWatch Program and the fields of interest related to the program.  
Appendix C is a sample of an agenda from one of the regional meetings that were held in 
2007.  From the opening remarks to the panel discussions, public health staff dominates.  
In this sample, which is typical of the other agendas for the 2007 regional meetings, 
speakers include state and local public health agency staff for lessons learned from 
actionable results to facilitated discussions for regional planning, which also include local 
fire, police, Federal Bureau of Investigations, and mass transit, and input from federal, 
state, and local EPA.  The sample agenda indicates that the role of federal, state, and local 
EPA is mechanical in collecting and replacing filters, assisting in filter placement in the 
cities, assuring that filters and sample collecting are consistent and uncompromised, and 
management of that area of the program.  The federal, state, and local EPA are not  
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responsible, however, for the consequence management and assurance of the public 
health response of the program when a positive filter is indicated.  That is the 
responsibility of the federal, state, and local public health agencies. 
This evidence does not mean that the federal, state, and local EPA does not have a 
role in BioWatch, but it does indicate that their solo leadership role should be eliminated 
and instead shared with public health at the state and local levels as well as the federal 
level.  EPA is vital to the measurement process and the technical side of the BioWatch 
program.  However, in order for BioWatch to achieve its full potential, it needs to be the 
mandate and the responsibility of the people who will ultimately use and respond to the 
information–public health.   
E. RELATIONSHIP OF BIOWATCH WITH PUBLIC HEALTH  
As mentioned earlier in this paper, there are governmental reports indicating that 
the U.S. EPA struggles with the administration of the BioWatch Program.  Reports 
include the March 23, 2005 Office of Inspector General’s reports, “EPA Needs to Fulfill 
Its Designated Responsibilities to Ensure Effective BioWatch Program” and the February 
20, 2004 report, “EPA’s Homeland Security Role to Protect Air From Terrorist Threats 
Needs to be Better Defined.”  The reports argue that the U.S. EPA does not have a 
framework in place to carry out the program and need guidelines for state and local 
entities to follow to improve quality assurance.  The BioWatch program’s primary 
purpose it to ensure safe air; however, it is testing for biological agents that will harm and 
cause a need for treatment for a large population within a very short period of time, 
depending on the agent within forty-eight hours.  The response to the findings will need 
to be carried out by public health at the local, state, and federal levels. 
Given the information in the two documents above, this thesis argues that the U.S. 
EPA, although it has a role, is not the appropriate agency to provide guidance to the 
public health community for BioWatch in regards to disease surveillance, planning and 
strategies. Currently, the EPA programs at the federal and state levels are being asked to 
set mandates and regulations for planning efforts for agencies with whom federal and 
state EPA programs do not have a traditional relationship nor does the state or federal 
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EPA programs know how to plan for biological events that threaten the health and lives 
of the general public.  Currently, the state and federal EPAs are expected to provide 
structure and make judgments related to filter placement, safety of those collecting filters, 
and the urgency of information dissemination to critical partners.  To fix the problem of 
the struggles of the federal and state EPAs, a new approach is needed so that the state 
public health departments can take the administrative responsibilities over the local 
public health agencies, which is obviously a strong relationship.  
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III. SOLUTIONS 
As mentioned in the Introduction, the BioWatch Program is a new program in the 
civilian world and there is little data at this point to analyze.  However, there have been 
several positive hits, including one in St. Louis during the major events of the 2006 
National League Playoffs and the World Series, and several management meetings where 
implementation strategies were discussed.  Given that this is a new program, there are 
improvements and changes being made yearly and policies and procedures are being 
evaluated.  However, one constant is that the U.S. EPA is the lead agency at the federal 
level, receiving dollars from the U.S. DHS, and the state EPAs are the lead at the state 
level.  There are two solutions that this thesis will explore to provide public health the 
muscle they need to gain more control of the program and provide needed guidance to 
public health agencies for program administration.   
A. RESTRUCTURING AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL 
The first considerations for the federal BioWatch Program is restructuring the 
program at the federal level or at least consider how the program is presented to all 
agencies involved in order to establish new leadership or provide guidance on a shared 
leadership between two federal agencies and clearly defined roles for sister agencies at 
the state and local levels.  The restructuring would take a great deal of work and 
commitment from the federal departments and would require the CDC to either take 
those that now administer the program into their agency or take the administrative duties 
and place those duties on existing staff or add new staff.  In addition, the CDC would 
have to provide the U.S. EPA with their portion of the dollars for equipment and supplies 
related to the BioWatch Program and develop procedures for reporting between the 
agencies.  The CDC also should be inclusive of the BioWatch Program in the Public 
Health Preparedness Cooperative Agreement.  Although the state agencies can plan and 




language in the guidance that outlines expectations of the states with BioWatch Programs 
and does not require states with BioWatch Programs to address how the program is being 
supported and planning efforts related to the program. 
B. DEVELOPMENT OF MOAS AT THE STATE LEVEL 
An alternative to restructuring at the federal level would be to pursue individual, 
state level memorandum of agreement (MOA) between the state departments of EPA and 
public health to create an agreement between the agencies that will make the BioWatch 
Program implementation and monitoring solid and will move the program forward in 
states and cities that are struggling.  The second solution shifts the changes to the state 
level where each state can control the split between the agencies and each can provide 
their own unique language to the solution.  To make this work, the state agencies must 
develop a MOA and clearly define which agency has what role and administrative duties.   
A possible guide for how these MOA can be established is the MOA entered into 
by the US EPA and the CDC in 2004 titled:  “Memorandum of Agreement Among the 
Department of Homeland Security, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and 
the Environmental Protection Agency,” Appendix B.  Although conversation regarding 
this MOA was discussed earlier in this paper, the content and basic ideas behind the 
MOA are relevant and should not be dismissed and can be applied to other MOAs 
developed for the purpose of BioWatch.  The MOA provides details for the two agencies 
and outlines the responsibilities of each including the following. 
 Services provided by the CDC to the EPA and state and local agencies 
 Services provided by the EPA to the CDC and local U.S. EPA programs 
 CDC and U.S. EPA performance standards 
 U.S. DHS responsibilities 
 Regular reports 
 Meeting schedule 
 Points of contact in each program 
Using this structure, the state agencies can enter into agreements that focus on the 
problems and needs unique to the state BioWatch Program.  Through research and by 
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partnering with key individuals at the state, EPA the author suggested that a MOA be 
developed that would outline clearly the role of the state health department as well as the 
responsibilities of each state department.  Appendix D is a sample MOU that the state of 
Missouri developed during the author’s employment there to make the BioWatch 
Program stronger and functional. The Missouri MOA includes the following. 
 Establishment of administrative responsibilities to the state department of 
health related to the local public health agencies 
 Establishes an annual BioWatch exercise through public health funding 
 Establishes meeting timelines between the state health department and the 
state EPA department 
 Defines the role of the state EPA to the U.S. DHS and the reporting 
requirements 
The MOA will change the make up of the BioWatch Program at the state level 
and eventually the local level by providing the state health department with authority to 
mandate the local public health agencies to exercise the BioWatch Program and have 
developed policies and procedures for such things as defining what agency(ies) will be 
responsible for picking up samples outside the normal pick up time if warranted by a 
positive, attending mandated meetings set by the state EPA and health departments 
related to the BioWatch Program, and requiring consequence management policies. 
A new implementation process would be provided by introducing the MOA as 
seen in Figure 4.  The MOA would strengthen the state public health’s role in the process 
and would allow the entity to provide invaluable administrative oversight that is lacking 
in the BioWatch Program.  Currently, the state EPA does not have the ability to demand 
that local public health agencies attend mandatory meetings where critical decisions are 
made, nor do the local public health agencies have a regular schedule for BioWatch 
Program exercises because the state EPA does not have funding sources for them to 
support the exercises.  The new implementation plan would also provide dollars to the 
program through the Public Health Preparedness Cooperative Agreement by planning 
exercises and training around the BioWatch Program that fit into the goals of the 
Cooperative Agreement.  The MOA opens a new avenue for strategies and policies that 
are lacking in the program as described above.   
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Figure 4 demonstrates how the MOAs would support the BioWatch Program 
among the primary partners.  The U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
would continue to work with their MOA and strengthen the ties among the agencies.  In a 
mirror of that MOA, the state agencies that reflect their federal partners would develop an 
MOA that echo their own needs and strengthen their relationship and process related to 
the BioWatch Program. 
 
 
Figure 4.   Proposed BioWatch MOA Implementation 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
A. PROS AND CONS OF SOLUTIONS 
The solutions above have both hurdles that must be overcome for implementation.  
The first solution of moving the program at the federal level is, though not impossible, 
may be a bit impractical.  The expense of moving the program from the U.S. EPA to the 
CDC can be expensive and cause further confusion at the state and local levels.  It is also 
evident that both the CDC and the U.S. EPA share aspects of the program and neither 
seem to have the edge over the other when it comes to a clear leadership role.  This 
particular solution also may not solve the most pressing implementation and response 
problems of BioWatch.   
Both the EPA and the CDC need to have leadership roles within BioWatch.  
Having sole leadership with the EPA has generated many problems as documented in this 
thesis.  However, having sole leadership with the CDC may also lead to problems.  The 
BioWarch program does not work without the air quality control expertise of the EPA.  It 
is those individuals that run the program day to day by overseeing collection of the 
samples, ensuring appropriate equipment and supplies are on hand and provide technical 
training to individuals who collect daily samples.  Therefore, shifting the program to the 
CDC for primary responsibility may simply reverse the leadership problems at the state 
and local levels.  
The second option is more viable and responsible.  It would provide the 
following. 
 The ability of the states to develop their own MOAs and divide leadership 
roles for their own situation.  For example, Missouri may also want to 
have some type of MOA with public health agencies or the EPA program 
in Illinois because the program is a bi-state program, which comes with its 





 A simple solution to a complex problem that can be solved without 
involvement from the federal level.  
 A written guide for expectations for each of the programs that have the 
primary responsibility of keeping the BioWatch Program working on a 
day to day basis and the entity that must know what to do when the “bell 
rings.” 
It must be noted, however, that the MOA solution is not the answer to all 
problems.  As in the example of the federal MOA, it only is a solution if the signees 
follow the guidelines and if they provide the services and products, they have agreed. 
The implementation of the MOA for the state of Missouri was a challenging 
effort.  Both departments are required to go through legal review and agreement must be 
realized before the MOA can be put into place, which takes valuable time.  In addition, 
the MOA does not transfer any dollars for the monitoring and administration of the 
BioWatch Program in relationship to the local public health agencies.  In times where 
dollars are limited, the MOA is difficult to support by management because dollars for 
other efforts must be used to carryout the objectives of the MOA.  Moreover, there has to 
be someone within each department that has to take a special interest in making the MOA 
a living document; without that component, the MOA fails to provide the shift in policy 
required. 
B. PROBLEMS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Further research is urgently needed into the problems and options for the 
BioWatch Program and leadership issues.  The research and findings should include “For 
Official Use Only” documents such as after action reports, surveys and interviews with 
BioWatch leaders with the understanding that the findings will be only for limited 
distribution.  The real findings and strengths to this argument is in those materials and 
interviews.  Until those findings can be discovered, compiled, and considered, other 




























7:00  REGISTRATION 
    
 8:00  WELCOME AND OPENING REMARKS  
 Al Romanosky (Moderator) 
Office of Public Health Preparedness & Response 
Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene 
 
Michael Osterholm, Director 
Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy (CIDRAP) 
 
 Jeffrey Stiefel, Director, Early Warning Division 
Department of Homeland Security, Office of Health Affairs 
  
8:35  BIOWATCH PORTAL 
Brian Maguire, Communications Outreach Manager 
Global Secure Systems   
 
8:45  BIOWATCH MULTIPLEXED PCR ASSAY (BIO-PLEX)  
Richard Meyer, Senior Advisor to the Director 
Division of Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
    
 9:30  GUARDIAN PROGRAM BRIEFING 
Lt Col Karen House, United States Air Force 
Director, CBRN Installation Protection Program 
 
10:00  BREAK 
 
10:20  OUTDOOR ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING  
Moderator: Robert Myers, Deputy Director Scientific Programs 
Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene Laboratories 
 
Outdoor Guidance Document Overview 
CAPT Ken Martinez, Associate Director 
NIOSH-Emergency Response & Preparedness Office 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
 
Development of Play Books and Response Plans, 
Phase I and II  
Don McLaughlin, Federal On-Scene Coordinator, E.P.A. Region III 
United States Environmental Protection Agency 
   
Gyspy Moth Study  
W. Brent Daniel 
 Los Alamos National Laboratory 




11:40  LESSONS LEARNED FROM A BIOWATCH ACTIONABLE RESULT  
St. Louis BioWatch Program 
Nancy Bush, Director, Center for Emergency Response and Terrorism 
Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services  
 
12:00  LUNCH (on your own) 
 
 
1:30  INDOOR ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING  
Moderator: Al Romanosky, Office of Public Health Preparedness & Response 
 Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene 
 
Indoor Sampling Issues and Practical Applications 
Mark Durno, Federal On-Scene Coordinator, E.P.A. Region V  
United States Environmental Protection Agency 
  
Indoor Sampling Playbook Development 
William Hoppes, Environmental Scientist 
Chemical and Biological National Security Program 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 
  
Approaches for Indoor Environmental Sampling Response Planning 
CAPT Ken Martinez, Associate Director 
NIOSH-Emergency Response & Preparedness Office 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
  
2:30  BREAK 
 
2:50  PANEL: INDOOR PROGRAM  
Moderator:  Michael Osterholm, Director 
Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy 
  
DHS Programmatic Issues, Placement of Indoor System, Awareness Building 
TBD (Jeff Stiefel) 
 
NCR System Perspective, Metro System 
Lt. George W. Burns, Counter Terrorism Coordinator 
Washington Metropolitan Area Transportation Authority 
 
New York Regional Response Plan 
David Dlugolenski, Manager, Disaster Mitigation 
Office of Emergency Management 
The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey 
 
4:00  RISK COMMUNICATION 
Federal Perspective 
Chad Wood, Risk Communications Advisor 





4:25  WRAP UP 
 




DRAFT SPECIAL PURPOSE MONITORING NETWORK 
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT 
Between 
 




Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services 
 
 
1.0 Background and Purpose 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND:  The U.S. Department of Homeland Security provides 
funding to the Missouri Department of Natural Resources to administer 
the BioWatch Program in the City of St. Louis.  The program 
administration consists of contracting the local public health agencies to 
collect and replace filters and to provide training and education to those 
that will be providing filter collection on a day-to-day basis and during 
times of positive results on filters. 
 
1.2 PURPOSE:  The purpose of the MOA is to set forth the terms and 
conditions by which the Missouri Department of Health and Senior 
Services will provide monitoring of the local public health agencies to 
ensure administrative duties, including training and consequence 
management planning efforts, are completed and reported to the Missouri 
Departments of Natural Resources and the Missouri Department of Health 
and Senior Services so that timely and accurate reporting can be made to 




2.1 Department of Health and Senior Services:  Referred to as “DHSS” herein. 
2.2 Missouri Department of Natural Resources: Referred to as “DNR” herein. 
2.3 Special Purpose Monitoring: Referred to as “SPM” herein. 





3.1 DHSS shall provide training, education, and supply provide a BioWatch 
exercise support through the City Readiness Initiative (CRI) for the St. 
Louis CRI Region annually.  DHSS and DNR will participate in the 
exercise as support to the local public health agencies.  
 
3.2 DHSS shall perform the monitoring of the DHS St. Louis area Special 
Purpose Monitoring Network subgrants to ensure that administrative 
duties are completed that relate to training and education.  DHSS will 
monitor the subgrantees attendance at all mandated meetings, training, and 
education as required by DHSS, DNR, and DHS. 
 
3.3 DHSS shall review local planning documents related to the BioWatch 
Program and shall provided feedback as needed.  DHSS staff that review 
the planning documents shall have at a minimum a “secret” clearance. 
 
3.4 DHSS shall report the monitoring findings identified in 3.1 above to the 
DNR.  Upon notification of non-compliance, DNR agrees to collaborate 
with DHSS to withhold the appropriate amount of funding until the 
subgrantee's administrative obligations have been fulfilled. 
 
3.5 DHSS and DNR agree to meet twice annually to discuss program 
management. 
 
3.6 DHSS will provide assistance to DNR in the development of the subgrants 
language pertaining to the administrative duties as identified in 3.1 above 
in compliance with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the 
DHS. 
 
3.7 DHSS will provide assistance to DNR in the development of grant 
applications as they relate to 3.1 above. 
 
3.8 DHSS will sign the attached DHS Non-Disclosure agreement. DNR will 
provide DHSS with grant language pertaining to the security requirements 
in which DHSS agrees to abide. 
 
4.0 Termination 
This agreement shall become effective upon the signature of all parties and shall 
remain in effect until otherwise agreed upon by the parties.  All parties may 





5.0 Capacity to Enter Into Agreement 
The persons executing this Memorandum of Agreement on behalf of DNR and 
DHSS/Center for Emergency Response and Terrorism hereby represent and 
warrant that they have the right, power, legal capacity, and appropriate authority 
to enter into this agreement on behalf of the entity for which they sign. 
 
Missouri Department of Health  
and Senior Services 















Air Pollution Control Program 
 
 
XXXXXX, Division Director 
Division of Community and Public Health 
 
 
XXXXXX, Division Director 
Division of Environmental Quality    
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